Giménez Amaya Abstract

Neuroscience and Freedom

The aim of this paper is to briefly illustrate some of the philosophical premises that I believe are influencing the neuroscientific study of freedom, and certain problems that have emerged from within the field of Neurosciences itself in terms of the global understanding of brain function, neural networks and the neurobiological integration of attention. All these phenomena seem to be critically important to the proper neurobiological understanding of freedom. Moreover, there are other aspects of human life that affect our freedom of action and that challenge a purely reductionist concept of free will, a view proposed by some neuroscientists, who are still to convince their detractors. Finally, some brief comments have been introduced about the modern concept of freedom and the need for interdisciplinary work to adequately address the issues that productively link experimental and theoretical disciplines. We exemplify this latter issue by addressing the subtle persistence of dualism in certain approaches to the study of freedom and the recovery of the concept of life in our understanding of human activity.